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Abstract
Consistency check has been the only criterion for theory evaluation
in logic-based approaches to reasoning about actions. This work goes
beyond that and contributes to the metatheory of actions by investi-
gating what other properties a good domain description in reasoning
about actions should have. We state some metatheoretical postulates
concerning this sore spot. When all postulates are satisfied together
we have a modular action theory. Besides being easier to understand
and more elaboration tolerant in McCarthy’s sense, modular theories
have interesting properties. We point out the problems that arise
when the postulates about modularity are violated and propose al-
gorithmic checks that can help the designer of an action theory to
overcome them.
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1 Introduction
In logic-based approaches to knowledge representation, a given domain is
described by a set of logical formulas T , which we call a (non-logical) theory.
That is also the case for reasoning about actions, where we are interested in
theories describing particular actions. We call such theories action theories.
A priori satisfiability is the only criterion that formal logic provides to
check the quality of such descriptions. In this work we go beyond that, and
argue that we should require more than the mere existence of a model for a
given theory.
Our starting point is that in reasoning about actions one usually distin-
guishes several kinds of logical formulas. Among these are effect axioms,
precondition axioms, and domain constraints. In order to distinguish such
non-logical axioms from logical axioms, we prefer to speak of effect laws, ex-
ecutability laws, and static laws, respectively. Moreover we single out those
effect laws whose effect is ⊥, and call them inexecutability laws.
Given these types of laws, suppose the language is powerful enough to
state that action a is inexecutable in contexts where ϕ1 holds, and executable
in contexts where ϕ2 holds. It follows that there can be no context where
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 holds. Now ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) is a static law that does not mention a. It
is natural to expect that ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) follows from the static laws alone. By
means of examples we show that when this is not the case, then unexpected
conclusions might follow from the theory T , even in the case T is consistent.
This motivates postulates requiring that the different laws of an action
theory should be arranged modularly, i.e., in separated components, and in
such a way that interactions between them are limited and controlled. In
essence, we argue that static laws may influence the laws for actions, but
the dynamic part of a theory should not influence the non-dynamic one. It
will turn out that in all existing accounts allowing for these four kinds of
laws [31, 34, 44, 3, 47], consistent action theories can be written that violate
this requirement. We here give algorithms that allow one to check whether
an action theory satisfies the postulates we state. With such algorithms, the
task of correcting flawed action theories can be made easier.
Although we here use the syntax of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) [15],
all we shall say applies as well to first-order formalisms, in particular to the
Situation Calculus [36]. All postulates we are going to present can be stated
as well for other frameworks, in particular for action languages such as A,
AR [10, 24, 12] and others, and for Situation Calculus based approaches.
In [19] we have given a Situation Calculus version of our analysis.
This work is organized as follows: after some background definitions (Sec-
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tion 2) we state (Section 3) some postulates concerning action descriptions.
In Sections 4 and 5, we study the two most important of these postulates, giv-
ing algorithmic methods to check whether an action theory satisfies them or
not. We then generalize (Section 6) and discuss (Section 7) possible strength-
enings of our set of postulates, and show interesting results that their sat-
isfaction gives us (Section 8). Finally, before concluding, we assess related
work found in the literature on metatheory of actions (Section 9).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Dynamic logic
Here we establish the ontology of dynamic domains. As our base formalism
we use PDL. For more details, see [15, 16].
Let Act = {a1, a2, . . .} be the set of all atomic action constants of a given
domain. Examples of atomic actions are load and shoot. We use a as a vari-
able standing for a particular atomic action. To each atomic action a there
is an associated modal operator [a]. Here we suppose that the underlying
multimodal logic is independently axiomatized (i.e., the logic is a fusion and
there is no interaction between the modal operators [25, 26]).
Prop = {p1, p2, . . .} denotes the set of all propositional constants, also
called fluents or atoms. Examples of those are loaded and alive. We use p as
an atom variable.
We suppose both Act and Prop are finite.
We use small Greek letters ϕ, ψ, . . . to denote classical formulas. They
are recursively defined in the following way:
ϕ ::= p | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ↔ ϕ
Fml is the set of all classical formulas.
Examples of classical formulas are walking → alive and ¬(bachelor ∧
married).
A classical formula is classically consistent if there is at least one valua-
tion in the classical propositional logic that makes it true. Given ϕ ∈ Fml,
val(ϕ) denotes the set of all valuations of ϕ. We identify |= with the logical
consequence in Classical Propositional Logic |=
CPL
.
The set of all literals is Lit = Prop ∪ {¬p : p ∈ Prop}. Examples of
literals are alive and ¬walking. l will be used as a literal variable. If l = ¬p,
then we identify ¬l with p.
A clause χ is a disjunction of literals. We say that a literal l appears in a
clause χ, written l ∈ χ, if l is a disjunct of χ.
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We denote complex formulas (with modal operators) by capital Greek
letters Φ1, Φ2, . . . They are recursively defined in the following way:
Φ ::= ϕ | [a]Φ | 〈a〉Φ | ¬Φ | Φ ∧ Φ | Φ ∨ Φ | Φ→ Φ | Φ↔ Φ
where Φ denotes a complex formula. 〈a〉 is the dual operator of [a], de-
fined as 〈a〉Φ =Def ¬[a]¬Φ. Sequential composition of actions is defined by
the abbreviation [a1; a2]Φ =Def [a1][a2]Φ. Examples of complex formulas are
loaded→ [shoot]¬alive and [load]loaded.
For parsimony’s sake, whenever there is no confusion we identify a set of
formulas with the conjunction of the formulas it is made of. The semantics
we take into account here is that for multimodal K [39, 2].
Definition 2.1 A PDL-model is a triple M = 〈W,R,V〉 where W is a
nonempty set of possible worlds (alias possible states), R: Act −→ 2W×W
maps action constants a to accessibility relations Ra ⊆ W × W, and V:
Prop −→ 2W maps propositional constants to subsets of W.
Definition 2.2 Given a PDL-model M = 〈W,R,V〉, the satisfaction rela-
tion is defined as the smallest relation satisfying:
• |=
M
w
p (p is true at world w of model M ) if w ∈ V(p);
• |=
M
w
[a]Φ if for every w′ such that wRaw
′, |=
M
w′
Φ;
• the usual truth conditions for the other connectives.
Definition 2.3 A PDL-model M is a model of Φ (noted |=
M
Φ) if and only
if for all w ∈W, |=
M
w
Φ. M is a model of a set of formulas T (noted |=
M
T )
if and only if |=
M
w
Φ for every Φ ∈ T .
Definition 2.4 A formula Φ is a consequence of the set of global axioms
{Φ1, . . . , Φn} in the class of all PDL-models (noted {Φ1, . . . , Φn} |=
PDL
Φ) if
and only if for every PDL-model M , if |=
M
Φi for every Φi, then |=
M
Φ.1
Having established the formal substratum our presentation will rely on,
we present in the next section the different types of formulas we use to
describe dynamic domains.
1In [3] local consequence is considered. For that reason a further modal operator ✷
had to be introduced, resulting in a logic which is multimodal K plus monomodal S4 for
✷, and where axiom schema ✷Φ→ [a]Φ holds.
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2.2 Describing action theories in PDL
Before elaborating a theory, we need to specify what we are about to describe,
i.e., what the formulas we state talk about. Following the tradition in the
literature, we identify a domain (alias scenario) with the actions we take into
account and the fluents they can change. More formally, we have:
Definition 2.5 A domain is a tuple 〈Act,Prop〉.
An example of a domain is the well-known Yale Shooting Scenario [14],
whose actions are load, wait and shoot, and whose fluents are loaded and
alive.
Given a domain, we are interested in theories whose statements describe
the behavior of actions on the considered fluents. PDL allows for the repre-
sentation of such statements, that we here call action laws. We distinguish
several types of them. We call effect laws formulas relating an action to its
effects. Statements of conditions under which an action cannot be executed
are called inexecutability laws. Executability laws in turn stipulate the con-
text where an action is guaranteed to be executable. Finally, static laws are
formulas that do not mention actions. They express constraints that must
hold in every possible state. These four types of laws are our fundamental
entities and we introduce them more formally in the sequel.
2.2.1 Static laws
Frameworks which allow for indirect effects of actions make use of logical
formulas that state invariant propositions about the world. Such formulas
delimit the set of possible states. They do not refer to actions, and we
suppose here that they are expressed as formulas of classical propositional
logic.
Definition 2.6 A static law2 is a formula ϕ ∈ Fml that is classically consis-
tent.
An example of a static law is walking → alive, saying that if a turkey is
walking, then it must be alive [44]. Another one is saved↔ (mbox1∨mbox2),
which states that an e-mail message is saved if and only if it is in mailbox 1
or in mailbox 2 or both [4].
2Static laws are often called domain constraints or integrity constraints. Because the
different laws for actions that we shall introduce in the sequel could in principle also be
called like that, we avoid these terms.
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In action languages such as A and AR we would write the statement
alive if walking, and in the Situation Calculus it would be the first-order
formula
∀s(Holds(walking, s)→ Holds(alive, s)).
The set of all static laws of a given domain is denoted by S . At first
glance, no requirement concerning consistency of S is made. Of course, we
want S to be consistent, otherwise the whole theory is inconsistent. As we
are going to see in the sequel, however, consistency of S alone is not enough
to guarantee the consistency of a theory.
2.2.2 Effect laws
Logical frameworks for reasoning about actions contain expressions linking
actions and their effects. We suppose that such effects might be conditional,
and thus get a third component of such laws.
In PDL, the formula [a]ϕ expresses that ϕ is true after every possible
execution of a.
Definition 2.7 An effect law3 for action a is of the form ϕ → [a]ψ, where
ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml, with ϕ and ψ both classically consistent.
The consequent ψ is the effect which obtains when action a is executed
in a state where the antecedent ϕ holds. An example of an effect law is
loaded→ [shoot]¬alive, saying that whenever the gun is loaded, after shooting
the turkey is dead. Another one is⊤ → [tease]walking: in every circumstance,
the result of teasing is that the turkey starts walking. For parsimony’s sake,
the latter effect law will be written [tease]walking.
Note that the consistency requirements for ϕ and ψ make sense: if ϕ is
inconsistent then the effect law is superfluous; if ψ is inconsistent then we
have an inexecutability law, that we consider as a separate entity and which
we are about to introduce formally in the sequel.
For the first example above, in action languages one would write the
statement
shoot causes ¬alive if loaded,
and in the Situation Calculus formalism one would write the first-order for-
mula
∀s(Holds(loaded, s)→ ¬Holds(alive, do(shoot, s))).
3Effect laws are often called action laws, but we prefer not to use that term here because
it would also apply to executability laws that are to be introduced in the sequel.
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2.2.3 Inexecutability laws
We consider effect laws whose consequent ψ is inconsistent as a particular
kind of law which we call inexecutability laws. (Such laws are sometimes
called qualifications [35].) This allows us to avoid mixing things that are
conceptually different: for an action a, an effect law mainly associates it
with a consequent ψ, while an inexecutability law only associates it with an
antecedent ϕ, viz. the context which precludes the execution of a.
Definition 2.8 An inexecutability law for action a is of the form ϕ→ [a]⊥,
where ϕ ∈ Fml is classically consistent.
For example ¬hasGun → [shoot]⊥ expresses that shoot cannot be exe-
cuted if the agent has no gun. Another example is dead→ [tease]⊥: a dead
turkey cannot be teased.
In AR we would write the statement impossible shoot if ¬hasGun, and in
the Situation Calculus our example would be
∀s(¬Holds(hasGun, s)→ ¬Poss(shoot, s)).
2.2.4 Executability laws
With only static and effect laws one cannot guarantee that the action shoot
can be executed whenever the agent has a gun. We need thus a way to state
the conditions under which an action is guaranteed to be executable.
In dynamic logic the dual 〈a〉ϕ, defined as ¬[a]¬ϕ, can be used to express
executability. 〈a〉⊤ thus reads “the execution of action a is possible”.
Definition 2.9 An executability law4 for action a is of the form ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤,
where ϕ ∈ Fml is classically consistent.
For instance hasGun → 〈shoot〉⊤ says that shooting can be executed
whenever the agent has a gun, and ⊤ → 〈tease〉⊤, also written 〈tease〉⊤,
establishes that the turkey can always be teased.
In action languages such laws are not represented. In Situation Calculus
our example would be stated as
∀s(Holds(hasGun, s)→ Poss(shoot, s)).
4Some approaches (most prominently Reiter’s) use biconditionals ϕ ↔ 〈a〉⊤, called
precondition axioms. This is equivalent to ¬ϕ ↔ [a]⊥, highlighting that they merge
information about inexecutability with information about executability. In this work we
consider these entities different and keep them separated.
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Whereas all the extant approaches in the literature that allow for indirect
effects of actions contain static and effect laws, and provide a way for repre-
senting inexecutabilities (in the form of implicit qualifications [11, 31, 44]),
the status of executability laws is less consensual. Some authors [43, 7, 34, 44]
more or less tacitly consider that executability laws should not be made ex-
plicit but rather inferred by the reasoning mechanism. Others [31, 47] have
executability laws as first class objects one can reason about.
It seems a matter of debate whether one can always do without exe-
cutabilities. In principle it seems to be strange to just state information
about necessary conditions for action execution (inexecutabilities) without
saying anything about its sufficient conditions. This is the reason why we
think that we need executability laws. Indeed, in several domains one wants
to explicitly state under which conditions a given action is guaranteed to be
executable, e.g. that a robot never gets stuck and is always able to execute
a move action. And if we have a plan such as load; shoot (load followed by
shoot) of which we know that it achieves the goal ¬alive, then we would like
to be sure that it is executable in the first place!5 In any case, allowing for
executability laws gives us more flexibility and expressive power.
2.2.5 Action theories
Given a domain 〈Act,Prop〉, for an action a ∈ Act, we define Ea as the set
of its effect laws, X a the set of its executability laws, and Ia that of its
inexecutability laws.
Definition 2.10 An action theory for a is a tuple T a = 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉.
In our running scenario example, a theory for the action shoot would be
S = {walking→ alive}, E shoot = {loaded→ [shoot]¬alive},
X shoot = {hasGun→ 〈shoot〉⊤}, Ishoot = {¬hasGun→ [shoot]⊥}
Given a dynamic domain we define E =
⋃
a∈Act E
a, X =
⋃
a∈ActX
a, and
I =
⋃
a∈ActI
a. All these sets are finite, because Act is finite and each of the
Ea, X a, Ia is finite.
Definition 2.11 An action theory T is a tuple of the form 〈S , E ,X , I〉.
For parsimony’s sake, whenever there is no confusion we write S , E ,X , I |=
PDL
Φ instead of S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I |=
PDL
Φ.
5Of course this would require a solution to the qualification problem [35].
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When performing the task of formalizing dynamic domains, we face the
frame problem [36] and the ramification problem [9]. In what follows we
formally present the logic of actions in which action theories will henceforth
be described.
2.3 Dynamic logic and the frame problem
As it was already expected, the logical formalism of PDL alone does not
solve the frame problem. For instance, if 〈S , E ,X , I〉 describes our shooting
domain, then
S , E ,X , I 6|=
PDL
hasGun→ [load]hasGun.
The same can be said about the ramification problem in what concerns
the derivation of indirect effects not properly caused by the action under
consideration. For example,
S , E ,X , I |=
PDL
[tease]alive.
Thus, given an action theory 〈S , E ,X , I〉, we need a consequence relation
powerful enough to deal with the frame and ramification problems. This
means that the deductive power of PDL has to be augmented in order to
ensure that the only non-effects of actions that follow from the theory are
those that are really relevant. The presence of static constraints makes that
this is a delicate task, and starting with [31, 34], several authors have argued
that some notion of causality is needed. We here opt for the dependence
based approach presented in [3], which has been shown in [6] to subsume
Reiter’s solution to the frame problem [41], and moreover at least partially
accounts for the ramification problem.
In the logical framework developed in [3], metalogical information, given
in the form of a dependence relation, is added to PDL.
Definition 2.12 (Dependence relation [3]) A dependence relation is a
binary relation ❀ ⊆ Act× Lit.
The expression a ❀ l denotes that the execution of action a may make
the literal l true. In our example we have
❀ =
{
〈shoot,¬loaded〉, 〈shoot,¬alive〉,
〈shoot,¬walking〉, 〈tease,walking〉
}
,
which means that action shoot may make the literals ¬loaded, ¬alive and
¬walking true, and action tease may make walking true.
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Semantically, the dependence-based approach relies on the explanation
closure assumption [43]. The reasoning behind its solution to the frame
problem consists in a kind of negation as failure: Because 〈load,¬hasGun〉 /∈
❀, we have load 6❀ ¬hasGun, i.e., ¬hasGun is never caused by load. Thus,
in a context where hasGun is true, after every execution of load, hasGun still
remains true. We also have tease 6❀ alive and tease 6❀ ¬alive. The meaning
of all these independences is that the frame axioms hasGun→ [load]hasGun,
¬alive→ [tease]¬alive and alive→ [tease]alive hold.
We assume ❀ is finite.
A dependence relation ❀ defines a class of possible worlds models M
❀
.
Definition 2.13 Given a❀-model M = 〈W,R,V〉, the satisfaction relation
is defined as the smallest relation satisfying:
• all the truth conditions of Definition 2.2.
• whenever wRaw
′ then:
– 6|=
M
w
p implies 6|=
M
w′
p, if a 6❀ p;
– |=
M
w
p implies |=
M
w′
p, if a 6❀ ¬p.
Given M ∈ M
❀
, Φ and T , |=
M
Φ and |=
M
T are defined as in Defini-
tion 2.3.
Definition 2.14 A formula Φ is a ❀-based consequence of {Φ1, . . . , Φn} in
the class of all ❀-models (noted {Φ1, . . . , Φn} |=
❀
Φ) if and only if for every
❀-model M , if |=
M
Φi for every Φi, then |=
M
Φ.
In our example it thus holds
S , E ,X , I |=
❀
hasGun→ [load]hasGun
and
S , E ,X , I |=
❀
¬alive→ [tease]¬alive.
In this way, the dependence-based approach solves the frame problem.
However, it does not entirely solve the ramification problem: while indirect
effects such as loaded → [shoot]¬walking can be deduced with |=
❀
without
explicitly stating that in the set of effect laws for shoot, we still have to state
indirect dependences such as shoot ❀ ¬walking. Nevertheless, according to
Reiter’s view:
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“what counts as a solution to the frame problem . . . is a system-
atic procedure for generating, from the effect laws, . . . a parsimo-
nious representation for [all] the frame axioms” [42].
We comply with that as we can define a semi-automatic procedure for
generating the dependence relation from the set of effect laws. Moreover, as
it has been argued in [4, 18], our approach is in line with the state of the
art because none of the existing solutions to the frame and the ramification
problems can handle domains with both indeterminate and indirect effects.
In the next section we turn to a metatheoretical analysis of action theories
and make a step toward formal criteria for theory evaluation. Before that,
we need a definition.
Definition 2.15 Let 〈S , E ,X , I〉 be an action theory and ❀ its associ-
ated dependence relation. Then M = 〈W,R,V〉 is the big (alias maxi-
mal/standard) model for 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and ❀ if and only if:
• M is a ❀-model;
• W = val(S ) (all valuations of S );
• Ra = {(w,w
′) : ∀ϕ→ [a]ψ ∈ E ∪ I , if |=
M
w
ϕ, then |=
M
w′
ψ}.
In the rest of the paper we characterize when an action theory with a
dependence relation has a big model.
3 Postulates
“When does a given action theory have a model?”, and, more importantly, “is
that model what we really expect from it?” are questions that naturally arise
when we talk about action theories. Here we claim that all the approaches
that are put forward in the literature are too liberal in the sense that we can
have satisfiable action theories that are intuitively incorrect. We argue that
something beyond the consistency notion is required in order to help us in
answering those questions.
We do not attempt here to provide a ‘magical’ method for making an
action theory intuitive. Instead, what we are going to do in what follows is
to provide some guidelines that help detecting unintuitive consequences of a
theory and identifying its problematic part(s).
Our central thesis is that the different types of laws define in Section 2.2
should be neatly separated in different modules. Besides that, we want such
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laws to interfere only in one sense: static laws together with action laws for
a may have consequences that do not follow from the action laws for a alone.
The other way round, action laws should not allow to infer new static laws,
effect laws should not allow to infer inexecutability laws, action laws for a
should not allow to infer action laws for a′, etc. This means that our logical
modules should be designed in such a way that they are as specialized and
as little dependent on others as possible.
A first step in this direction has been the proposed division of our entities
into the sets S , E , X and I . In order to accomplish our goal, we have to di-
minish interaction among such modules, rendering them the least interwoven
we can. The rest of the section contains postulates expressing this.
PC (Logical consistency): S , Ea,X a, Ia 6|=
❀
⊥
The theory of a given action should be logically consistent.
PS (No implicit static laws):
if S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ, then S |= ϕ
If a classical formula can be inferred from the action theory, then it should
be inferable from the set of static laws alone. (Note that on the left we use
consequence inM
❀
, while on the right we use consequence in classical logic:
as both S and ϕ are classical, ϕ should be inferable from S in classical logic.)
PI (No implicit inexecutability laws):
if S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, then S , Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥
If an inexecutability law for an action a can be inferred from its action theory,
then it should be inferable in PDL from the static laws and the inexecutability
laws for a alone. Note that we used |=
PDL
instead of |=
❀
because we also
suppose that neither frame axioms nor indirect effects should be relevant to
derive inexecutability laws. The same remark holds for the postulates that
follow.
PX (No implicit executability laws):
if S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤, then S ,X a |=
PDL
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
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If an executability law for a can be inferred from its action theory, then it
should already “be” in X a, in the sense that it should also be inferable in
PDL from the set of static and executability laws for a alone.
Postulate PC is obvious, for we are interested in consistent theories. It
can be shown that PX is a consequence of PS (see Corollary 8.1).
Thus, while PC is obvious and PX can be ensured by PS, things are less
obvious for Postulates PS and PI: it turns out that for all approaches in
the literature they are easily violated by action theories that allow to express
the four kinds of laws. We therefore study each of these postulates in the
subsequent sections by means of examples, give algorithms to decide whether
they are satisfied, and discuss about what to do in the case the answer is
‘no’.
4 No implicit static laws
While executability laws increases expressive power, they might conflict with
inexecutability laws. Consider, for example, the following action theory:
S1 = {walking→ alive}, E1 =
{
[tease]walking,
loaded→ [shoot]¬alive
}
,
X1 = {〈tease〉⊤}, I1 = {¬alive→ [tease]⊥}
and the dependence relation:
❀ =
{
〈shoot,¬loaded〉, 〈shoot,¬alive〉,
〈shoot,¬walking〉, 〈tease,walking〉
}
From this description we have the unintuitive X tease1 , I
tease
1 |=PDL alive: the
turkey is immortal! This is an implicit static law because alive does not
follow from S1 alone: 〈S1, E
tease
1 ,X
tease
1 , I
tease
1 〉 violates Postulate PS.
How can we find out whether an action theory for a satisfies PostulatePS?
Theorem 4.1 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and ❀ satisfy Postulate PS if and only if the
big model for 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and ❀ is a model of 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and ❀.
Proof:
(⇒): Let M = 〈W,R,V〉 be a big model of 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and❀, and suppose
|=
M
S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I (M is a model of S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I ). Then W = val(S ),
i.e., for all ϕ ∈ Fml and all w ∈W, if |=
M
w
ϕ, then there is a valuation v of S
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such that v makes ϕ true. From this it follows that if |=
M
w
ϕ for all w ∈ W,
then ϕ is true in all valuations of S . Hence S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ implies S |= ϕ,
and then 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and ❀ satisfy Postulate PS.
(⇐): Let M = 〈W,R,V〉 be a big model of 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and ❀. Suppose
〈S , E ,X , I〉 and❀ do not satisfy Postulate PS. Then there must be ϕ ∈ Fml
such that S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ and S 6|= ϕ. This means that there is a valuation
v of S that falsifies ϕ. As v ∈W (because M is a big model) then M is not
a model of 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and ❀.
We shall give an algorithm to find a finite characterization of all6 implicit
static laws of a given action theory 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉. The idea is as follows:
for each executability law ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ in the theory, construct from Ea, Ia and
❀ a set of inexecutabilities {ϕ1 → [a]⊥, . . . , ϕn → [a]⊥} that potentially
conflict with ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if ϕ∧ϕi is satisfiable w.r.t. S ,
mark ¬(ϕ∧ϕi) as an implicit static law. Incrementally repeat this procedure
(adding all the ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕi) that were caught to S ) until no implicit static law
is obtained.
For an example of the execution of the algorithm, consider 〈S1, E
tease
1 ,X
tease
1 , I
tease
1 〉
with ❀ as above. For the action tease, we have the executability 〈tease〉⊤.
Now, from E tease1 , I
tease
1 and ❀ we try to build an inexecutability for tease.
We take [tease]walking and compute then all indirect effects of tease w.r.t.
S1. From walking → alive, we get that alive is an indirect effect of tease,
giving us [tease]alive. But 〈tease, alive〉 /∈ ❀, which means the frame axiom
¬alive → [tease]¬alive holds. Together with [tease]alive, this gives us the
inexecutability ¬alive → [tease]⊥. As S1 ∪ {⊤,¬alive} is satisfiable (⊤ is
the antecedent of the executability 〈tease〉⊤), we get ¬alive → ⊥, i.e., the
implicit static law alive. For this example no other inexecutability for tease
can be derived, so the computation stops.
Before presenting the pseudo-code of the algorithm we need some defini-
tions.
Definition 4.1 Let ϕ ∈ Fml and χ a clause. χ is an implicate of ϕ if and
only if ϕ |= χ.
In our running example, alive is an implicate of the set of formulas
{walking→ alive,walking}.
Definition 4.2 Let ϕ ∈ Fml and χ a clause. χ is a prime implicate of ϕ if
and only if
6Actually what the algorithm does is to find an interpolant of all implicit static laws
of the theory.
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• χ is an implicate of ϕ, and
• for every implicate χ′ of ϕ, χ′ |= χ implies χ |= χ′.
The set of all prime implicates of a formula ϕ is denoted PI (ϕ).
For example, the set of prime implicates of p1 is just {p1}, and that of
p1 ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p2) ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p3 ∨ p4) is {p1, p2, p3 ∨ p4}. In our shooting domain,
alive is a prime implicate of {walking→ alive,walking}. For more on prime
implicates and their properties, see [33].
Definition 4.3 Let ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml. Then NewConsϕ(ψ) = PI (ϕ ∧ ψ) \ PI (ϕ).
The function NewConsϕ(ψ) computes the new consequences of ϕ w.r.t.
ψ: the set of strongest clauses that follow from ϕ∧ψ, but do not follow from
ϕ alone (cf. e.g. [21]). It is computed by subtracting the prime implicates of
ϕ from those of ϕ ∧ ψ. For example, NewConsp
1
((¬p1 ∨ p2) ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p3 ∨
p4)) = {p2, p3 ∨ p4}. And for our scenario, NewConswalking→alive(walking) =
{alive,walking}.
The algorithm below improves the one in [20] by integrating a solution
to the frame problem (via the dependence relation ❀). As a matter of
notation, we define Ca = Ea ∪ Ia as the set of all formulas expressing the
direct consequences of an action a, whether they are consistent or not.
Algorithm 4.1 (Finding all implicit static laws induced by a)
input: 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 and ❀
output: Simp*, the set of all implicit static laws of 〈S , E
a,X a, Ia〉
Simp*:= ∅
Ca:= Ea ∪ Ia
repeat
Simp:= ∅
for all ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a do
for all Cˆa ⊆ Ca such that Cˆa 6= ∅ do
ϕCˆa:=
∧
{ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa}
ψCˆa:=
∧
{ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa}
for all χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa) do
if S ∪ Simp* ∪ {ϕ, ϕCˆa,¬χ} 0 ⊥ and ∀li ∈ χ, a 6❀ li then
Simp:= Simp ∪ {¬(ϕ ∧ ϕCˆa ∧ ¬χ)}
Simp*:= Simp* ∪ Simp
until Simp = ∅
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In each step of the algorithm, S ∪ Simp* is the updated set of static laws
(the original ones fed with the implicit laws caught up to that point). At the
end, Simp* collects all the implicit static laws.
Theorem 4.2 Algorithm 4.1 terminates.
Proof: Let Ca = Ea∪Ia. First, the set of candidates to be an implicit static
law that might be due to a and that are examined in the repeat-loop is
{¬(ϕ ∧ ϕCˆa ∧ ¬χ) : Cˆ
a ⊆ Ca, ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa)}
As X a and Ia are finite, this set is finite.
In each step either the algorithm stops because Simp = ∅, or at least one
of the candidates is put into Simp in the outermost for-loop. (This one ter-
minates, because X a, Ca and NewCons are finite.) Such a candidate is not
going to be put into Simp in future steps, because once added to S ∪ Simp*,
it will be in the set of laws S ∪Simp* of all subsequent executions of the out-
ermost for-loop, falsifying its respective if-test for such a candidate. Hence
the repeat-loop is bounded by the number of candidates, and therefore Al-
gorithm 4.1 terminates.
This is the key algorithm of the paper. We are aware that it comes
with considerable computational costs: first, the number of formulas ϕCˆa
and ψCˆa is exponential in the size of C
a, and second, the computation of
NewConsS (ψCˆa) might result in exponential growth. While we might expect
Ca to be reasonably small in practice (because Ea and Ia are in general small),
the size of NewConsS (ψCˆa) is more difficult to control.
Example 4.1 For 〈S1, E
tease
1 ,X
tease
1 , I
tease
1 〉, Algorithm 4.1 returns Simp* =
{alive}.
Theorem 4.3 An action theory 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 with❀ satisfies PostulatePS
if and only if Simp* = ∅.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 4.4 Let Simp* be the output of Algorithm 4.1 on input 〈S , E
a,X a, Ia〉
and ❀. Then
1. 〈S ∪ Simp*, E
a,X a, Ia〉 has no implicit static law.
2. S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
∧
Simp*.
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Proof: Item 1. is straightforward from the termination of Algorithm 4.1
and Theorem 4.3. Item 2. follows from the fact that by the if-test in Algo-
rithm 4.1, the only formulas that are put in Simp* at each execution of the
repeat-loop are exactly those that are implicit static laws of the original
theory.
Corolary 4.1 For all ϕ ∈ Fml, S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ if and only if S ∪Simp* |=
ϕ.
Proof: For the left-to-right direction, let ϕ ∈ Fml be such that S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ. Then S ∪ Simp*, E
a,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ, by monotonicity. By Theorem 4.4-1.,
〈S ∪ Simp*, E
a,X a, Ia〉 has no implicit static law, hence S ∪ Simp* |= ϕ.
The right-to-left direction is straightforward by Theorem 4.4-2.
What shall we do once we have discovered an implicit static law?
The existence of implicit static laws may indicate too strong executability
laws: in Example 4.1, we wrongly assumed that tease is always executable.
Thus one way of ‘repairing’ our theory would be to consider the weaker
executability alive→ 〈tease〉⊤ instead of 〈tease〉⊤ in X tease.
On the other hand, implicit static laws may also indicate that the inexe-
cutability laws are too strong:
Example 4.2 Consider S = ∅, E shoot = {loaded → [shoot]¬alive}, X shoot =
{hasGun → 〈shoot〉⊤} and Ishoot = {[shoot]⊥}, with ❀ still as above. For
this theory Algorithm 4.1 returns Simp* = {¬hasGun}.
In Example 4.2 we discovered that the agent never has a gun. The prob-
lem here can be overcome by weakening [shoot]⊥ in Ishoot with ¬hasGun →
[shoot]⊥.7
We can go further on this reasoning and also argue that the problem
may be due to a too strong set of effect laws or even to too strong frame
axioms (i.e., a too weak dependence relation). To witness, for Example 4.1,
if we replace the law [tease]walking by the weaker alive→ [tease]walking, the
resulting action theory would satisfy Postulate PS. In the same way, stat-
ing the (unintuitive) dependence tease ❀ alive (which means the frame ax-
iom ¬alive→ [tease]¬alive is no longer valid) guarantees satisfaction of PS.
(Note, however, that this solution becomes intuitive when alive is replaced
by awake.)
7Regarding Examples 4.1 and 4.2, one might argue that in practice such silly errors
will never be made. Nevertheless, the examples here given are quite simplistic, and for
applications of real interest, whose complexity will be much higher, we simply cannot rely
on the designer’s knowledge about all side effects the stated formulas can have.
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To finish, implicit static laws of course may also indicate that the static
laws are too weak:
Example 4.3 Suppose a computer representation of the line of integers, in
which we can be at a strictly positive number, pos, or at a negative one
or zero, ¬pos. Let maxInt and minInt, respectively, be the largest and the
smallest representable integer number. goLeft is the action of moving to the
biggest integer strictly smaller than the one at which we are. Consider the
following action theory for this scenario (ati means we are at number i):
S = {ati → pos : 0 < i ≤ maxInt} ∪ {ati → ¬pos : minInt ≤ i ≤ 0}
E =
{atminInt → [goLeft]underflow}∪
{ati → [goLeft]ati−1 : i > minInt},
X = {〈goLeft〉⊤}, I = ∅
with the dependence relation (minInt ≤ i ≤ maxInt):
❀ =
{
〈goLeft, ati〉, 〈goLeft, pos〉,
〈goLeft,¬pos〉, 〈goLeft, underflow〉
}
Applying Algorithm 4.1 to this action theory gives us all the implicit static
laws of the form ¬(ati∧atj), i 6= j, i.e., we cannot be at two different numbers
at the same time.
To summarize, in order to satisfy Postulate PS, an action theory should
contain a complete set of static laws or, alternatively, should not contain too
strong action laws.
Remark 4.1 S ∪ Simp* in general is not intuitive.
Whereas in the latter example the implicit static laws should be added
to S , in the others the implicit static laws are unintuitive and due to an
(in)executability law that is too strong and should be weakened. Of course,
how intuitive the modified action theory will be depends mainly on the knowl-
edge engineer’s choice.
To sum it up, eliminating implicit static laws may require revision of S ,
Ea or❀, or completion of X a and Ia. Completing Ia is the topic we address
in the next section.
5 No implicit inexecutability laws
Let S2 = S1, E2 = E1 and I2 = ∅ (executabilities do not matter here), and
let ❀ be that for 〈S1, E1,X1, I1〉. Note that 〈S2, E2,X2, I2〉 satisfies Postu-
late PS. From [tease]walking it follows with S2 that [tease]alive, i.e., in every
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situation, after teasing the turkey, it is alive: S2, E
tease
2 |=PDL [tease]alive. Now
as tease 6❀ alive, the status of alive is not modified by tease, and we have
S2, E
tease
2 |=
❀
¬alive→ [tease]¬alive. From the above, it follows
S2, E
tease
2 ,X
tease
2 , I
tease
2 |=
❀
¬alive→ [tease]⊥,
i.e., an inexecutability law stating that a dead turkey cannot be teased. But
S2, I
tease
2 6|=PDL ¬alive→ [tease]⊥,
hence Postulate PI is violated. Here the formula ¬alive → [tease]⊥ is an
example of what we call an implicit inexecutability law.
In the literature, such laws are also known as implicit qualifications [11],
and it has been often supposed, in a more or less tacit way, that it is a
positive feature of frameworks to leave them implicit and provide mechanisms
for inferring them [31, 45]. The other way round, one might argue as well
that implicit qualifications indicate that the domain has not been described
in an adequate manner: the form of inexecutability laws is simpler than
that of effect laws, and it might be reasonably expected that it is easier to
exhaustively describe them.8 Thus, all inexecutabilities of a given action
should be explicitly stated, and this is what Postulate PI says.
How can we check whether PI is violated? We can conceive an algorithm
to find implicit inexecutability laws of a given action a. The basic idea is as
follows: for every combination of effect laws of the form (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn) →
[a](ψ1∧. . .∧ψn), with each ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
a, if ϕ1∧. . .∧ϕn is consistent w.r.t.
to S , ψ1∧. . .∧ψn inconsistent w.r.t. S , and S , I
a 6|=
PDL
(ϕ1∧. . .∧ϕn)→ [a]⊥,
then output (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn) → [a]⊥ as an implicit inexecutability law. Our
algorithm basically does this, and moreover takes into account dependence
information.
For an example of the execution of the algorithm, take 〈S2, E
tease
2 ,X
tease
2 , I
tease
2 〉
with ❀ as given above. From E tease2 we get ⊤ → [tease]walking, whose
antecedent is consistent with S . As |=
❀
¬alive → [tease]¬alive and S ∪
{walking} |= alive, and because S , Itease2 6|=PDL (⊤ ∧ ¬alive) → [tease]⊥, we
caught an implicit inexecutability. As there is no other combination of effect
laws for tease, we end the simulation here.
Below is the pseudo-code of the algorithm for that (the reason X a is not
needed in the input will be made clear in the sequel):
Algorithm 5.1 (Finding implicit inexecutability laws for a)
8Note that this concerns the necessary conditions for executability, and thus it is not
related to the qualification problem, which basically says that it is difficult to state all the
sufficient conditions for executability.
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input: 〈S , Ea, Ia〉 and ❀
output: Iaimp , the set of implicit inexecutability laws for a
Iaimp:= ∅
for all Eˆa ⊆ Ea do
ϕEˆa:=
∧
{ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa}
ψEˆa:=
∧
{ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa}
for all χ ∈ NewConsS (ψEˆa) do
if ∀li ∈ χ, a 6❀ li and S , I
a
0 (ϕEˆa ∧ ¬χ)→ [a]⊥ then
Iaimp:= I
a
imp ∪ {(ϕEˆa ∧ ¬χ)→ [a]⊥}
Theorem 5.1 Algorithm 5.1 terminates.
Proof: Straightforward, as we have assumed S , E , I and ❀ finite, and
NewCons is finite (because S and ψEˆa are finite).
Example 5.1 Consider S2, E
tease
2 , I
tease
2 and ❀ as given above. Then Algo-
rithm 5.1 returns Iteaseimp = {¬alive→ [tease]⊥}.
Nevertheless, to apply Algorithm 5.1 is not enough to guarantee Postu-
late PI, as illustrated by the following example:
Example 5.2 (Incompleteness of Algorithm 5.1 without PS) Let S =
∅, Ea = {p1 → [a]p2}, X
a = {〈a〉⊤}, Ia = {p2 → [a]⊥}, and ❀= ∅. Then
we have S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
p1 → [a]⊥, but after running Algorithm 5.1 on
〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 we have S , Iaimp 6|=PDL p1 → [a]⊥.
Example 5.2 shows that the presence of implicit static laws (induced by
executabilities) implies the existence of implicit inexecutabilities that are
not caught by Algorithm 5.1. One possibility of getting rid of this is by
considering the weaker version of PI:
PI’ (No implicit inexecutability laws – weak version):
if S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, and S , Ea,X a, Ia 6|=
❀
¬ϕ,
then S , Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥
If a non-trivial inexecutability law for a given action a can be inferred from
its respective theory, then it should be inferable in PDL from the static and
inexecutability laws for it alone.
With an adaptation of Algorithm 5.1 to take X a in its input and support
a test for satisfiability of an inexecutability’s antecedent, we could guarantee
completeness with respect to Postulate PI’. However such a test has the same
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complexity of checking whether Postulate PS is satisfied. That is the reason
we keep abide on PI and require 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 to satisfy Postulate PS prior
to running Algorithm 5.1. This gives us the following result:
Theorem 5.2 If 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 with ❀ satisfies Postulate PS, then it sat-
isfies Postulate PI if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
Proof: See Appendix B.
With Algorithm 5.1, not only do we decide whether Postulate PI is sat-
isfied, but we also get information on how to “repair” the action theory. The
set of implicit inexecutabilities so obtained provides logical and metalogical
information concerning the correction that must be carried out: in the first
case, elements of Iaimp can be added to I
a; in the second one, Iaimp helps in
properly changing Ea or ❀. For instance, to correct the action theory of our
example, the knowledge engineer would have the following options:
1. Add the qualification ¬alive→ [tease]⊥ to Itease2 ; or
2. Add the (unintuitive) dependence 〈tease, alive〉 to ❀; or
3. Weaken the effect law [tease]walking to alive→ [tease]walking in E tease.
It is easy to see that whatever she opts for, the resulting action theory for
tease will satisfy Postulate PI (while still satisfying PS).
Example 5.3 (Drinking coffee [19]) Suppose, for instance, a hypotheti-
cal situation in which we reason about the effects of drinking a cup of coffee:
S = ∅, Edrink =
{
sugar→ [drink]happy,
salt→ [drink]¬happy
}
, X drink = Idrink = ∅
and the dependence relation
❀= {〈drink, happy〉, 〈drink,¬happy〉}
Observe that 〈S , Edrink,X drink, Idrink〉 satisfiesPS. Then, running Algorithm 5.1
on this action theory will give us Idrinkimp = {(sugar ∧ salt)→ [drink]⊥}.
Remark 5.1 Ia ∪ Iaimp is not always intuitive.
Whereas in Example 5.1 we have got an inexecutability that could be
safely added to Itease2 , in Example 5.3 we got an inexecutability that is un-
intuitive (just the presence of sugar and salt in the coffee precludes drinking
it). In that case, revision of other parts of the theory should be considered in
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order to make it intuitive. Anyway, the problem pointed out in the depicted
scenario just illustrates that intuition is beyond syntax. The scope of this
work relies on the syntactical level. Only the knowledge engineer can judge
about how intuitive a formula is.
In what follows we revisit our postulates in order to strengthen them to
the case where more than one action is under concern and thus get results
that can be applied to whole action theories.
6 Generalizing the postulates
We have seen the importance that satisfaction of Postulates PC, PS and PI
may have in describing the action theory of a particular action a. However,
in applications of real interest more than one action is involved, and thus a
natural question that could be raised is “can we have similar metatheoretical
results for complex action theories”?
In this section we generalize our set of postulates to action theories as a
whole, i.e., considering all actions of a domain, and prove some interesting
results that follow from that. As we are going to see, some of these results
are straightforward, while others must rely on some additional assumptions
in order to hold.
A generalization of Postulate PC is quite easy and has no need for justi-
fication:
PC* (Logical consistency): S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
⊥
The whole action theory should be logically consistent.
Generalizing Postulate PS will give us the following:
PS* (No implicit static laws):
if S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ, then S |=
PDL
ϕ
If a classical formula can be inferred from the whole action theory, then it
should be inferable from the set of static laws alone. We have the following
results:
Theorem 6.1 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PS* if and only if 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 satis-
fies PS for all a ∈ Act.
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Proof:
(⇒): Straightforward.
(⇐): Suppose 〈S , E ,X , I〉 does not satisfy PS*. Then there is ϕ ∈ Fml
such that S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ and S 6|= ϕ. ϕ is equivalent to ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ ϕn, with
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Fml and such that there is at least one ϕi such that S 6|= ϕi
(otherwise S |= ϕ). Because the logic is independently axiomatized, there
must be some a ∈ Act such that S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕi. From this and S 6|= ϕi
it follows that 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 does not satisfy PS.
Theorem 6.2 If 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PS*, then 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PC*
if and only if 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 satisfies PC for all a ∈ Act.
Proof: Straightforward as the underlying logic is independently axiomatized.
A more general form of Postulate PI can also be stated:
PI* (No implicit inexecutability laws):
if S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, then S , I |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥
If an inexecutability law can be inferred from the whole action theory, then
it should be inferable in PDL from the static and inexecutability laws alone.
Note that having that 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 satisfies PI for all a ∈ Act is not
enough to 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfyPI* if there are implicit static laws. To witness,
let S = Ea1 = ∅, and X a1 = {〈a1〉⊤}, I
a1 = {ϕ → [a1]⊥}. Let also E
a2 =
X a2 = Ia2 = ∅. Observe that both 〈S , Ea1,X a1 , Ia1〉 and 〈S , Ea2,X a2 , Ia2〉
satisfy PI, but S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ→ [a2]⊥ and S , I 6|=
PDL
ϕ→ [a2]⊥.
Nevertheless, under PS* the result follows:
Theorem 6.3 Let 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfy PS*. 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PI* if and
only if 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 satisfies PI for all a ∈ Act.
Proof:
(⇒): Suppose that S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ → [a]⊥. By monotonicity of |=
❀
,
S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ → [a]⊥, too. As 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 satisfies PI*, S , I |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Now suppose that S , Ia 6|=
PDL
ϕ → [a]⊥. Then there exists a possible
worlds model M = 〈W,Ra,V〉 such that |=
M
S ∧ Ia and there is a possible
world v ∈ W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥. Let M ′ = 〈W′,R′,V′〉 be such
that W′ = W, V′ = V, R′a′ = ∅, for a
′ 6= a, and R′a = Ra. Then |=
M ′
S ∧ I ,
and as S , I |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥, we get a contradiction.
24
(⇐): Suppose that 〈S , E ,X , I〉 does not satisfy PI*. Then there exists
ϕ ∈ Fml such that S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥ and S , I 6|=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Claim: S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
To witness, suppose S , Ea,X a, Ia 6|=
❀
ϕ → [a]⊥. Then there exists a
possible worlds model M = 〈W,Ra,V〉 such that |=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ X a ∧ Ia and
there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
[a]⊥, i.e., there is
v′ ∈ W such that Ra(v) = v
′. (We are going to extend M to be a model of
〈S , E ,X , I〉.)
For each a′ ∈ Act, a′ 6= a, we define:
Ea
′
ψ (w) = {ψ : ϕ→ [a
′]ψ ∈ Ea
′
and |=
M
w
ψ}
Ia
′
(w) = {ϕ : ϕ→ [a′]⊥ ∈ Ia
′
and |=
M
w
ϕ}
X a
′
(w) = {ϕ : ϕ→ 〈a′〉⊤ ∈ X a
′
and |=
M
w
ϕ}
Let M ′ = 〈W′,R′,V′〉 be such that W′ = W, R′ = Ra ∪
⋃
a′ 6=a Ra′ , and
V′ = V, where for each a′ and every world w ∈W′:
• R′(w) = ∅, if Ia
′
(w) 6= ∅;
• R′(w) = w′, if Ea
′
ψ (w
′) 6= ∅.
Because, by hypothesis, 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static
law, i.e., S is complete in our sense. Then, M ′ is a model of S . We have
that M ′ is a model of E , too: for every ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ E and every w ∈ W′,
if |=
M ′
w
ϕ, then |=
M ′
w′
ψ for all w′ ∈ W′ such that wR′w′. Clearly M ′ is also
a model of I . M ′ is a model of X , too: it is a model of X a and for every
a′ 6= a and all those worlds w ∈ W′ such that X a
′
(w) 6= ∅ there is a world
accessible by R′, viz. some w′ such that Ea
′
ψ (w
′) 6= ∅ (because R′(w) = ∅
in this case would preclude X a
′
(w) 6= ∅, as long as PS* is satisfied). Thus
|=
M ′
S ∧E ∧X ∧I , but if this is the case, S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, hence we
must have S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥. (End of the proof of the claim.)
From S , I 6|=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥ it follows S , Ia 6|=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥. Putting all the
results together, we have that 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 does not satisfy Postulate PI.
In the next section we make a step toward an attempt of amending our
modularity criteria by investigating possible extensions of our set of postu-
lates.
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7 Disturbing modularity
Can we augment our set of postulates to take into account other modules
of action theories or even other metatheoretical issues in reasoning about
actions? That is the topic we discuss in what follows.
7.1 Postulates about effects of actions
It seems to be in line with our postulates to require action theories not to
allow for the deduction of new effect laws: if an effect law can be inferred
from an action theory (and no inexecutability for the same action in the same
context can be derived), then it should be inferable from the set of static and
effect laws alone. This means we should have:
PE (No implicit effect laws):
if S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]ψ and S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥,
then S , E |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]ψ
But consider the following intuitively correct action theory:
S4 = ∅, E4 =
{
loaded→ [shoot]¬alive,
(¬loaded ∧ alive)→ [shoot]alive
}
X4 = {hasGun→ 〈shoot〉⊤}, I4 = {¬hasGun→ [shoot]⊥}
together with the dependence shoot ❀ ¬alive. It satisfies Postulates PS*
and PI*, but does not satisfy PE. Indeed:
S4, E4,X4, I4 |=
❀
¬hasGun ∨ loaded→ [shoot]¬alive
and
S4, E4,X4, I4 6|=
❀
¬hasGun ∨ loaded→ [shoot]⊥,
but
S4, E4 6|=
❀
¬hasGun ∨ loaded→ [shoot]¬alive
So, Postulate PE would not help us to deliver the goods.
Another possibility of improving our modularity criteria could be:
P⊥ (No unattainable effects):
if ϕ→ [a]ψ ∈ E , then S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥
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This expresses that if we have explicitly stated an effect law for a in some
context, then there should be no inexecutability law for the same action in
the same context. It is straightforward to design an algorithm which checks
whether this postulate is satisfied. We do not investigate this further here,
but just observe that the slightly stronger version below leads to unintuitive
consequences:
P⊥’ (No unattainable effects – strong version):
if S , E |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]ψ, then S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥
Indeed, for the above action theory we have
E4 |=
❀
(¬hasGun ∧ loaded)→ [shoot]¬alive,
but
S4, E4,X4, I4 |=
❀
(¬hasGun ∧ loaded)→ [shoot]⊥.
This is certainly too strong. Our example also illustrates that it is sometimes
natural to have ‘redundancies’ or ‘overlaps’ between E and I . Indeed, as we
have pointed out, inexecutability laws are a particular kind of effect laws, and
the distinction here made is conventional. The decision of considering them
as strictly different entities or not depends mainly on the context. At a rep-
resentational level we prefer to keep them separated, while in Algorithm 4.1
we have mixed them together in order to compute the consequences of an
action.
In what follows we address the problem of completing the set of exe-
cutability laws of an action theory.
7.2 Maximizing executabilities
As we have seen, implicit static laws only show up when there are executabil-
ity laws. So, a question that naturally raises is “which executability laws can
be consistently added to a given action theory?”.
A hypothesis usually made in the literature is that of maximization of
executabilities: in the absence of a proof that an action is inexecutable in a
given context, assume its executability for that context. Such a hypothesis
is captured by the following postulate that we investigate in this section:
PX+ (Maximal executability laws):
if S , Ea,X a, Ia 6|=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, then S ,X a |=
PDL
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤
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Such a postulate expresses that if in context ϕ no inexecutability for a can
be inferred, then the respective executability should follow in PDL from the
executability and static laws.
Postulate PX+ generally holds in nonmonotonic frameworks, and can
be enforced in monotonic approaches such as ours by maximizing X a. We
nevertheless would like to point out that maximizing executability is not
always intuitive. To witness, suppose we know that if we have the ignition
key, the tank is full, . . ., and the battery tension is beyond 10V, then the car
(necessarily) will start. Suppose we also know that if the tension is below
8V, then the car will not start. What should we conclude in situations where
we know that the tension is 9V? Maximizing executabilities makes us infer
that it will start, but such reasoning is not what we want if we would like to
be sure that all possible executions lead to the goal.
8 Exploiting modularity
In this section we present other properties related to consistency and modu-
larity of action theories, emphasizing the main results that we obtain when
Postulate PS* is satisfied.
Theorem 8.1 If 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then S , E ,X , I |=
❀
⊥
if and only if S |= ⊥.
This theorem says that if there are no implicit static laws, then consistency
of an action theory can be checked by just checking consistency of S .
Theorem 8.2 If 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]ψ if and only if S , Ea, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]ψ.
Proof:
(⇐): Straightforward, by monotonicity.
(⇒): Suppose that S , Ea, Ia 6|=
❀
ϕ → [a]ψ. Then there exists a possible
worlds model M ∈ M
❀
, M = 〈W,Ra,V〉, such that |=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia and
there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
[a]ψ, i.e., there is
v′ ∈ W such that Ra(v) = v
′ and 6|=
M
v′
ψ. (We are going to extend M to
obtain a model of 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and thus show that S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ [a]ψ.)
For each a′ ∈ Act, a′ 6= a, we define:
Ea
′
ψ (w) = {ψ : ϕ→ [a
′]ψ ∈ Ea
′
and |=
M
w
ψ}
Ia
′
(w) = {ϕ : ϕ→ [a′]⊥ ∈ Ia
′
and |=
M
w
ϕ}
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X a
′
(w) = {ϕ : ϕ→ 〈a′〉⊤ ∈ X a
′
and |=
M
w
ϕ}
Let M ′ = 〈W′,R′,V′〉 be such that W′ = W, R′ = Ra ∪
⋃
a′ 6=a Ra′ , and
V′ = V, where for each a′ and every world w ∈W′:
• R′(w) = ∅, if Ia
′
(w) 6= ∅;
• R′(w) = w′, if Ea
′
ψ (w
′) 6= ∅.
Because, by hypothesis, 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static
law, i.e., S is complete in our sense. Then, M ′ is a model of S . We have
that M ′ is a model of E , too: for every ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ E and every w ∈ W′,
if |=
M ′
w
ϕ, then |=
M ′
w′
ψ for all w′ ∈ W′ such that wR′w′. Clearly M ′ is also
a model of I . M ′ is a model of X , too: it is a model of X a and for every
a′ 6= a and all those worlds w ∈ W′ such that X a
′
(w) 6= ∅ there is a world
accessible by R′, viz. some w′ such that Ea
′
ψ (w
′) 6= ∅ (because R′(w) = ∅ in
this case would preclude X a
′
(w) 6= ∅, as long as PS* is satisfied). Hence
|=
M ′
S ∧E ∧X ∧I . Because there are v, v′ ∈W′ such that |=
M ′
v
ϕ, R′(v) = v′
and 6|=
M ′
v′
ψ, we have S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ [a]ψ.
This means that under PS* we have modularity inside E , too: when
deducing the effects of a we need not consider the action laws for other
actions. Versions for executability and inexecutability can be stated as well:
Theorem 8.3 If 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies Postulate PS*, then S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ if and only if S ,X a |=
❀
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
Proof:
(⇐): Straightforward, by monotonicity.
(⇒): Suppose that S ,X a 6|=
❀
ϕ → 〈a〉⊤. Then there exists a possible
worlds model M ∈ M
❀
, M = 〈W,Ra,V〉, such that |=
M
S ∧ X a and
there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=
M
v
ϕ and 6|=
M
v
〈a〉⊤. (We are
going to extend M to build a model of 〈S , E ,X , I〉 and thus conclude that
S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.)
For each a′ ∈ Act, a′ 6= a, we define:
Ea
′
ψ (w) = {ψ : ϕ→ [a
′]ψ ∈ Ea
′
and |=
M
w
ψ}
Ia
′
(w) = {ϕ : ϕ→ [a′]⊥ ∈ Ia
′
and |=
M
w
ϕ}
X a
′
(w) = {ϕ : ϕ→ 〈a′〉⊤ ∈ X a
′
and |=
M
w
ϕ}
Let M ′ = 〈W′,R′,V′〉 be such that W′ = W, R′ = Ra ∪
⋃
a′ 6=a Ra′ , and
V′ = V, where for each a′ and every world w ∈W′:
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• R′(w) = ∅, if Ia
′
(w) 6= ∅;
• R′(w) = w′, if Ea
′
ψ (w
′) 6= ∅.
Because, by hypothesis, 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static
law, i.e., S is complete in our sense. Then, M ′ is a model of S . We have
that M ′ is a model of E , too: for every ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ E and every w ∈ W′,
if |=
M ′
w
ϕ, then |=
M ′
w′
ψ for all w′ ∈ W′ such that wR′w′. Clearly M ′ is also
a model of I . M ′ is a model of X , too: it is a model of X a and for every
a′ 6= a and all those worlds w ∈ W′ such that X a
′
(w) 6= ∅ there is a world
accessible by R′, viz. some w′ such that Ea
′
ψ (w
′) 6= ∅ (because R′(w) = ∅ in
this case would preclude X a
′
(w) 6= ∅, as long as PS* is satisfied). Hence
|=
M ′
S ∧ E ∧X ∧I . Because there is v ∈W′ such that |=
M ′
v
ϕ and 6|=
M ′
v
〈a〉⊤,
we have S , E ,X , I 6|=
❀
ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤.
Corolary 8.1 PX is a consequence of PS.
Proof: Straightforward.
Theorem 8.4 If 〈S , E ,X , I〉 satisfies PostulatesPS* andPI*, then S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥ if and only if S , Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Proof:
(⇐): Straightforward, by monotonicity.
(⇒): If S , E ,X , I |=
❀
ϕ → [a]⊥, then from PS* and Theorem 8.2 we have
S , Ea, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥. From this and PI* it follows S , Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
9 Related work
Pirri and Reiter have investigated the metatheory of the Situation Calcu-
lus [38]. In a spirit similar to ours, they use executability laws and effect
laws. Contrarily to us, their executability laws are equivalences and are thus
at the same time inexecutability laws. As they restrict themselves to domains
without ramifications, there are no static laws, i.e., S = ∅. For this setting
they give a syntactical condition on effect laws guaranteeing that they do
not interact with the executability laws in the sense that they do not entail
implicit static laws. Basically, the condition says that when there are effect
laws ϕ1 → [a]ψ and ϕ2 → [a]¬ψ, then ϕ1 and ϕ2 are inconsistent (which
essentially amounts to having in their theories a kind of “implicit static law
schema” of the form ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)).
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This then allows them to show that such theories are always consistent.
Moreover they thus simplify the entailment problem for this calculus, and
show for several problems such as consistency or regression that only some
of the modules of an action theory are necessary.
Amir [1] focuses on design and maintainability of action descriptions ap-
plying many of the concepts of the object-oriented paradigm in the Situation
Calculus. In that work, guidelines for a partitioned representation of a given
theory are presented, with which the inference task can also be optimized,
as it is restricted to the part of the theory that is really relevant to a given
query. This is observed specially when different agents are involved: the de-
sign of an agent’s theory can be done with no regard to others’, and after the
integration of multiple agents, queries about an agent’s beliefs do not take
into account the belief state of other agents.
In the referred work, executabilities are as in [38] and the same condi-
tion on effect laws is assumed, which syntactically precludes the existence of
implicit static laws.
Despite of using many of the object-oriented paradigm tools and tech-
niques, no mention is made to the concepts of cohesion and coupling [40],
which are closely related to modularity [19]. In the approach presented in [1],
even if modules are highly cohesive, they are not necessarily lowly coupled,
due to the dependence between objects in the reasoning phase. We do not
investigate this further here, but conjecture that this could be done there by,
during the reasoning process defined for that approach, avoiding passing to
a module a formula of a type different from those it contains.
The present work generalizes and extends Pirri and Reiter’s result to the
case where S 6= ∅ and both these works where the syntactical restriction
on effect laws is not made. This gives us more expressive power, as we can
reason about inexecutabilities, and a better modularity in the sense that we
do not combine formulas that are conceptually different (viz. executabilities
and inexecutabilities).
Zhang et al. [46] have also proposed an assessment of what a good ac-
tion theory should look like. They develop the ideas in the framework of
EPDL [47], an extended version of PDL which allows for propositions as
modalities to represent causal connection between literals. We do not present
the details of that, but concentrate on the main metatheoretical results.
Zhang et al. propose a normal form for describing action theories,9 and
investigate three levels of consistency. Roughly speaking, an action theory T
9But not as expressive as one might think: For instance, in modeling the nondetermin-
istic action of dropping a coin on a chessboard, we are not able to state [drop](black ∨
white). Instead, we should write something like [dropblack]black, [dropwhite]white,
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is uniformly consistent if it is globally consistent (i.e., T 6|=
EPDL
⊥); a formula
Φ is T -consistent if T 6|=
EPDL
¬Φ, for T a uniformly consistent theory; T
is universally consistent if (in our terms) every logically possible world is
accessible. T |=
EPDL
ϕ implies |=
EPDL
ϕ.
Furthermore, two assumptions are made to preclude the existence of im-
plicit qualifications. Satisfaction of such assumptions means the action the-
ory under consideration is safe, i.e., it is uniformly consistent. Such a normal
form justifies the two assumptions made and on whose validity relies their
notion of good action theories.
Given these definitions, they propose algorithms to test the different ver-
sions of consistency for an action theory T that is in normal form. This
test essentially amounts to checking whether T is safe, i.e., whether T |=
EPDL
〈a〉⊤, for every action a. Success of this check should mean the action theory
under analysis satisfies the consistency requirements.
Nevertheless, this is only a necessary condition: it is not hard to imagine
action theories that are uniformly consistent but in which we can still have
implicit inexecutabilities that are not caught by their algorithm. Consider
for instance a scenario with a lamp that can be turned on and off by a toggle
action, and its EPDL representation given by:
T =


on→ [toggle]¬on,
off→ [toggle]on,
[on]¬off,
[¬on]off


The causal statement [on]¬off means that on causes ¬off. Such an action
theory satisfies each of the consistency requirements (in particular it is uni-
formly consistent, as T 6|=
EPDL
⊥). Nevertheless, T is not safe for the static
law ¬(on ∧ off) cannot be proved.10
Although they are concerned with the same kind of problems that have
been discussed in this paper, they take an overall view of the subject, in
the sense that all problems are dealt with together. This means that in
their approach no special attention (in our sense) is given to the different
components of the action theory, and then every time something is wrong
[dropblack,white]black and [dropblack,white]white, where dropblack is the action of dropping
the coin on a black square (analogously for the others) and drop = drop
black
∪ drop
white
∪
dropblack,white, with “∪” the nondeterministic composition of actions.
10A possible solution could be to consider the set of static constraints explicitly in
the action theory (viz. in the deductive system). For the running example, taking into
account the constraint on↔ ¬off (derived from the causal statements and the EPDL global
axioms), we can conclude that T is safe. On the other hand, all the side effects such a
modification could have on the whole theory has yet to be analyzed.
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with it this is taken as a global problem inherent to the action theory as a
whole. Whereas such a “systemic” view of action theories is not necessarily
a drawback (we have just seen the strong interaction that exists between
the different sets of laws composing an action theory), being modular in our
sense allows us to better identify the “problematic” laws and take care of
them. Moreover, the advantage of allowing to find the set of laws which
must be modified in order to achieve the desired consistency is made evident
by the algorithms we have proposed (while their results only allow to decide
whether a given theory satisfies some consistency requirement).
Lang et al. [27] address consistency in the causal laws approach [34], fo-
cusing on the computational aspects. They suppose an abstract notion of
completion of an action theory solving the frame problem. Given an action
theory T a containing logical information about a’s direct effects as well as
the indirect effects that may follow (expressed in the form of causal laws), the
completion of T a roughly speaking is the original theory T a amended of logi-
cal axioms stating the persistence of all non-affected (directly nor indirectly)
literals. (Note that such a notion of completion is close to the underlying se-
mantics of the dependence relation used throughout the present paper, which
essentially amounts to the explanation closure assumption [43].)
Their executability problem is to check whether action a is executable
in all possible initial states (Zhang et al.’s safety property). This amounts
to testing whether every possible state w has a successor w′ reachable by a
such that w and w′ both satisfy the completion of T a. For instance, still
considering the lamp scenario, the representation of the action theory for
toggle is:
T toggle =


on
toggle
−→ off,
off
toggle
−→ on,
off −→ ¬on,
on −→ ¬off


where the first two formulas are conditional effect laws for toggle, and the
latter two causal laws in McCain and Turner’s sense. We will not dive in the
technical details, and just note that the executability check will return “no”
for this example as toggle cannot be executed in a state satisfying on ∧ off.
In the mentioned work, the authors are more concerned with the complex-
ity analysis of the problem of doing such a consistency test and no algorithm
for performing it is given, however. In spite of the fact their motivation is the
same as ours, again what is presented is a kind of “yes-no tool” which can
help in doing a metatheoretical analysis of a given action theory, and many
of the comments concerning Zhang et al.’s approach could be repeated here.
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Another criticism that could be made about both these approaches con-
cerns the assumption of full executability they rely on. We find it too
strong to require all actions to be always executable, and to reject as bad
an action theory admitting situations where some action cannot be exe-
cuted at all. As an example, consider the very simple action theory given
by S5 = S1, E5 = {[tease]walking}, X5 = X1 and I5 = I1, and consider
❀= {〈tease,walking〉}. Observe that, with our approach, it suffices to derive
the implicit inexecutability law ¬alive→ [tease]⊥, change I , and the system
will properly run in situations where ¬alive is the case.
On the other hand, if we consider the equivalent representation of such
an action theory in the approach of Lang et al., after computing the com-
pletion of T tease, if we test its executability, we will get the answer “no”, the
reason being that tease is not executable in the possible state where ¬alive
holds. Such an answer is correct, but note that with only this as guideline
we have no idea about where a possible modification in the action theory
should be carried on in order to achieve full executability for tease. The
same observation holds for Zhang et al.’s proposal.
Just to see how things can be even worse, consider the action theory
〈S
′
5, E
′
5,X
′
5, I
′
5〉, with S
′
5 = S5, E
′
5 = E5, X
′
5 = {alive → 〈tease〉⊤} and
I
′
5 = {¬alive → [tease]⊥}, with the same ❀, obtained by the correc-
tion of 〈S5, E5,X5, I5〉 above with the algorithms we propose. Observe that
〈S
′
5, E
′
5,X
′
5, I
′
5〉 satisfies all our postulates. It is not hard to see, however,
that the representation of such an action theory in the above frameworks,
when checked by their respective consistency tests, is still considered to have
a problem.
This problem arises because Lang et al.’s proposal do not allow for exe-
cutability laws, thus one cannot make the distinction between X = {〈tease〉⊤},
X = {alive→ 〈tease〉⊤} and X = ∅. By their turn, Zhang et al.’s allows for
specifying executabilities, but their consistency definitions do not distinguish
the cases alive→ 〈tease〉⊤ and 〈tease〉⊤.
A concept similar to that of implicit static laws was firstly addressed, as
far as we are concerned, in the realm of regulation consistency with deontic
logic [5]. Indeed, the notions of regulation consistency given in the mentioned
work and that of modularity presented in [20] and refined here can be proved
to be equivalent. The main difference between the mentioned work and the
approach in [20] relies on the fact that in [5] some syntactical restrictions on
the formulas have to be made in order to make the algorithm to work.
Lifschitz and Ren [30] propose an action description language derived
from C+ [13] in which domain descriptions can also be decomposed in mod-
ules. Contrarily to our setting, in theirs a module is not a set of formulas
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for given action a, but rather a description of a subsystem of the theory,
i.e., each module describes a set of interrelated fluents and actions. As an
example, a module describing Lin’s suitcase [31] should contain all causal
laws in the sense of C+ that are relevant to the scenario. Actions or fluents
having nothing to do, neither directly nor indirectly, with the suitcase should
be described in different modules. This feature makes such a decomposition
somewhat domain-dependent, while here we have proposed a type-oriented
modularization of the formulas, which does not depend on the domain.
In the referred work, modules can be defined in order to specialize other
modules. This is done by making the new module to inherit and then special-
ize other modules’ components. This is an important feature when elabora-
tions are involved. In the suitcase example, adding a new action relevant to
the suitcase description can be achieved by defining a new module inheriting
all properties of the old one and containing the causal laws needed for the
new action. Such ideas are interesting from the standpoint of software and
knowledge engineer: reusability is an intrinsic property of the framework,
and easy scalability promotes elaboration tolerance.
Consistency of a given theory and how to prevent conflicts between mod-
ules (independent or inherited) however is not addressed.
In this work we have illustrated by some examples what we can do in
order to make a theory intuitive. This involves theory modification. Action
theory change has been addressed in the recent literature on revision and
update [28, 29, 8]. In [17] we have investigated this issue and shown the
importance that modularity has in such a task.
10 Conclusion
Our contribution is twofold: general, as we presented postulates that ap-
ply to all reasoning about actions formalisms; and specific, as we proposed
algorithms for a dependence-based solution to the frame problem.
We have defined here the concept of modularity of an action theory and
pointed out some of the problems that arise if it is not satisfied. In particular
we have argued that the non-dynamic part of action theories could influence
but should not be influenced by the dynamic one.11
We have put forward some postulates, and in particular tried to demon-
strate that when there are implicit static and inexecutability laws then one
11It might be objected that it is only by doing experiments that one learns the static
laws that govern the universe. But note that this involves learning, whereas here – as
always done in the reasoning about actions field – the static laws are known once forever,
and do not evolve.
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has slipped up in designing the action theory in question. As shown, a possi-
ble solution comes into its own with Algorithms 4.1 and 5.1, which can give
us some guidelines in correcting an action theory if needed. By means of
examples we have seen that there are several alternatives of correction, and
choosing the right module to be modified as well as providing the intuitive
information that must be supplied is up to the knowledge engineer.
Given the difficulty of exhaustively enumerating all the preconditions un-
der which a given action is executable (and also those under which such an
action cannot be executed), it is reasonable to expect that there is always
going to be some executability precondition ϕ1 and some inexecutability pre-
condition ϕ2 that together lead to a contradiction, forcing, thus, an implicit
static law ¬(ϕ1∧ϕ2). This is the reason we propose to state some information
about both executabilities and inexecutabilities, and then run the algorithms
in order to improve the description.
It could be argued that unintuitive consequences in action theories are
mainly due to badly written axioms and not to the lack of modularity. True
enough, but what we have presented here is the case that making a domain
description modular gives us a tool to detect at least some of such problems
and correct it. (But note that we do not claim to correct badly written
axioms automatically and once for all.) Besides this, having separate entities
in the ontology and controlling their interaction help us to localize where the
problems are, which can be crucial for real world applications.
In this work we used a version of PDL, but our notions and results can
be applied to other frameworks as well. It is worth noting however that for
first-order based frameworks the consistency checks of Algorithms 4.1 and 5.1
are undecidable. We can get rid of this by assuming that 〈S , E ,X , I〉 is finite
and there is no function symbol in the language. In this way, the result of
NewCons is finite and the algorithm terminates.
The present paper is also a step toward a solution to the problem of
indirect dependences: indeed, if the indirect dependence shoot❀ ¬walking is
not in❀, then after running Algorithm 5.1 we get an indirect inexecutability
(loaded∧walking)→ [shoot]⊥, i.e., shoot cannot be executed if loaded∧walking
holds. Such an unintuitive inexecutability is not in I and thus indicates the
missing indirect dependence.
The general case is nevertheless more complex, and it seems that such
indirect dependences cannot be computed automatically in the case of inde-
terminate effects (cf. the example in [4]). We are currently investigating this
issue.
A different viewpoint of the work we presented here can be found in [19],
where modularity of action theories is assessed from a software engineering
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perspective. A modularity-based approach for narrative reasoning about
actions is given in [23].
Our postulates do not take into account causality statements linking
propositions such as those defined in [31, 34]. This could be a topic for
further investigation.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.3
An action theory 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 with ❀ satisfies Postulate PS if and only if
Simp* = ∅.
We recall that |= is logical consequence in Classical Propositional Logic,
and PI (A) is the set of prime implicates of the set A of classical formulas.
Before giving the proof of the theorem, we recall some properties of prime
implicates [32, 33] and the function NewCons [21]. Let ϕ ∈ Fml, A ⊆ Fml,
and χ be a clause. Then
1. |= ϕ↔
∧
PI (ϕ) [33, Corollary 3.2].
2. PI (A) ∪ NewConsA(ϕ) = PI (A ∧ ϕ) (from the definition of NewCons
).
3. |= A ∧ ϕ↔ A ∧ NewConsA(ϕ) (from 1 and 2)
4. If PI (ϕ) |= χ, then there exists χ′ ∈ PI (ϕ) such that χ′ |= χ [33,
Proposition 3.4].
Let ❀⊆ Act × Lit, ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a, Ca = Ea ∪ Ia, and Cˆa ⊆ Ca. We
define:
ϕCˆa =
∧
{ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa}
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ψCˆa =
∧
{ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa}
Lemma A.1 S∪{ψCˆa}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥ if and only if S∪NewConsS (ψCˆa)∪
{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥.
Proof: Consequence of Property 3.
Lemma A.2 If S ∪ NewConsS (ψCˆa) ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥, then ∃χ ∈
NewConsS (ψCˆa) such that S ∪ {χ} ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥.
Proof: Consequence of Properties 1, 2 and 4.
Lemma A.3 If S∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=⊥ and S∪NewConsS (ψCˆa)∪
{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥, then ∃χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa) such that S ∪ {χ} ∪
{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥.
Proof: By Lemma A.2 and Classical Logic.
Lemma A.4 If S∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=⊥ and S∪NewConsS (ψCˆa)∪
{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |= ⊥, then ∃χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa) such that both S ∪
{ϕ, ϕCˆa} ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥.
Proof: Trivially, by Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.5 If χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa) is such that S∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=
⊥ and S ∪{χ}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥, then S ∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li} 6|=⊥
and S ∪ {χ} ∪ {
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li} |=⊥.
Proof: Let χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa) be such that S∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=
⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=⊥.
If χ = ⊥, the result is trivial.
Let atm(ϕ) denote the set of atoms occurring in a classical formula ϕ.
• If atm(χ) 6⊂ atm(
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj), then the premise is false (and the
lemma trivially holds).
• If atm(χ) = atm(
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj), the lemma holds.
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• Let atm(χ) ⊂ atm(
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj). From S∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=
⊥ it follows S∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li} 6|=⊥. From S∪{χ}∪{
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} |=
⊥ and because S ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|= ⊥, it follows S ∪ {χ} ∪
{
∧
li∈χ
a 6❀li
¬li} |=⊥.
Lemma A.6 If χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa) is such that S∪{ϕ, ϕCˆa}∪{
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li} 6|=
⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪ {
∧
li∈χ
a 6❀li
¬li} |=⊥, then S ∪ {ϕ, ϕCˆa} ∪ {
∧
li∈χ
a 6❀li
¬li} 6|=⊥ and
∀li ∈ χ, a 6❀ li.
Proof: From S ∪ {ϕ, ϕCˆa} ∪ {
∧
li∈χ
a 6❀li
¬li} 6|=⊥ we conclude S ∪ {
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li} 6|=
⊥. From this and the hypothesis S ∪ {χ} ∪ {
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li} |= ⊥, it follows
S ∪ {
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li} |= ¬χ. If S |= ¬χ, then S , ψCˆa |= ¬χ, and because χ ∈
NewConsS (ψCˆa), we have χ |= ¬χ, a contradiction. Hence S ∪ {χ} 6|= ⊥.
Suppose now that there is at least one literal l ∈ χ such that ¬l does not ap-
pear in
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li. Then, the propositional valuation in which χl←true satisfies
S ∪ {χ} ∪
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li, and then S , {χ},
∧
li∈χ
a6❀li
¬li 6|= ⊥. Hence there cannot be
such a literal, and then ∀li ∈ χ, a 6❀ li.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
(⇒): Suppose Simp* 6= ∅. Then at the first step of the algorithm there has
been some ϕ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and some Cˆa ⊆ Ca such that S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
¬(ϕ ∧ ϕCˆa) and S 6|= ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕCˆa). Hence 〈S , E
a,X a, Ia〉 with ❀ does not
satisfy Postulate PS.
(⇐): Suppose that Simp* = ∅. Therefore for all ϕ
′ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and for all
subsets Cˆa ⊆ Ca, we have that
∀χ ∈ NewConsS (ψCˆa) if S ∪ {ϕ
′, ϕCˆa,¬χ} 6|=⊥, then ∃li ∈ χ, a❀ li (1)
From (1), the contraposition of Lemmas A.6–A.3, and Lemma A.1, it
follows that for all ϕ′ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a and Cˆa ⊆ Ca,
if S ∪ {ϕ′, ϕCˆa} ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=⊥, then S ∪ {ψCˆa} ∪ {
∧
|=
❀
¬lj→[a]¬lj
¬lj} 6|=⊥.
(2)
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Now, suppose S 6|= ϕ for some propositional ϕ. We will build a model
M such that M is a ❀-model for 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 that does not satisfy ϕ.
Let W be the set of all propositional valuations satisfying S that falsify
ϕ. As S 6|= ϕ, S ∪ {¬ϕ} is satisfiable, hence W must be nonempty. We
define the binary relation Ra on W such that wRaw
′ if and only if for every
ϕ→ [a]ψ ∈ Ca such that |=
M
w
ϕ:
• |=
M
w′
ψ; and
• |=
M
w′
¬lj for all lj such that a 6❀ lj and |=
M
w
¬lj .
Taking the obvious definition of V we obtain a model M = 〈W,R,V〉. We
have that M is a❀-model, by the definition of Ra, and |=
M
S ∧Ea∧X a∧Ia,
because:
• |=
M
S : by definition of W;
• |=
M
Ca: for every world w and every ϕ→ [a]ψ ∈ Ca, if |=
M
w
ϕ, then, by
the definition of Ra, |=
M
w′
ψ for all w′ ∈W such that wRaw
′;
• |=
M
X a: let Ea(w) = {ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ Ea :|=
M
w
ϕ}, and indepa(w) = {¬l :
a 6❀ l and |=
M
w
¬l}. Then, for every world w and every ϕ′ → 〈a〉⊤ ∈
X a, if |=
M
w
ϕ′∧ϕEa(w)∧indepa(w), then from (2), ψEa(w)∧indepa(w) 6|= ⊥.
As W is maximal, there exists at least one w′ such that |=
M
w′
ψEa(w) ∧
indepa(w). As Ra is maximal by definition, we have wRaw
′.
and the definition of Ra, there exists at least one w
′ such that wRaw
′.
Clearly 6|=
M
ϕ, by the definition of W. Hence S , Ea,X a, Ia 6|=
❀
ϕ. Therefore
〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 and ❀ violate Postulate PS.
B Proof of Theorem 5.2
If 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 with❀ satisfies Postulate PS, then it satisfies Postulate PI
if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
Let ❀⊆ Act× Lit and ϕ→ 〈a〉⊤ ∈ X a. For every Eˆa ⊆ Ea we define:
ϕEˆa =
∧
{ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa}
ψEˆa =
∧
{ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa}
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Moreover, we define
Iaimp = {(ϕEˆa∧¬χ)→ [a]⊥ : Eˆ
a ⊆ Ea,S∪{ϕEˆa,¬χ} 6|= ⊥, χ ∈ NewConsS (ψEˆa), a 6❀ li∀li ∈ χ}
Lemma B.1 If 〈S , Ea,X a, Ia〉 satisfies Postulate PS, then S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥ implies S , Ea, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Proof: Straightforward as a special case of Theorem 8.2.
Lemma B.2 If for each Eˆa we have S ∪ {ϕEˆa} 6|= ⊥ implies S ∪ {ψEˆa} 6|= ⊥,
then S , Ea, Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥ implies S , Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Proof: If S , Ia 6|=
PDL
ϕ → [a]⊥, then there exists a PDL-model M =
〈W,R,V〉 such that |=
M
S ∧ Ia, and there is a possible world w ∈ W such
that |=
M
w
ϕ and |=
M
w
〈a〉⊤.
(We are going to construct a counter-model for S , Ea, Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥.)
Let Ea(w) = {ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ Ea :|=
M
w
ϕ}. Then ϕEa(w) =
∧
{ϕi : ϕi →
[a]ψi ∈ E
a(w)} is such that |=
M
w
ϕEa(w). As S ∧ ϕEa(w) is thus satisfiable,
S ∧ ψEa(w), with ψEa(w) =
∧
{ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ E
a(w)}, must be satisfiable,
too (by hypothesis, because Ea(w) ⊆ Ea). Hence, there exists a propositional
valuation val such that val(S ∧ ψEa(w)) = 1.
Consider, thus, v such that v /∈ W, and extend V such that V(v) = val.
Let M ′ = 〈W′,R′,V′〉 be such that W′ = W ∪ {v}, R′a(w) = {v} for all u
such that |=
M
u
ϕ and R′a(u) = ∅ otherwise, and V
′ = V ∪ {(v,V(v))}.
Then:
• |=
M ′
S because |=
M
S and val(S ) = 1.
• |=
M ′
v
Ia because |=
M ′
v
[a]⊥, by definition of R′a(v), and |=
M ′
w
Ia because
6|=
M ′
w
ϕ for all ϕ→ [a]⊥ ∈ Ia, as 6|=
M
w
ϕ (otherwise, as |=
M
Ia, we would
not have |=
M
w
〈a〉⊤).
• |=
M ′
v
Ea because |=
M ′
v
[a]⊥, and |=
M ′
w
Ea by construction of M ′: R′a(w) =
{v} and |=
M ′
v
ψEa(w).
• |=
M ′
w
ϕ ∧ 〈a〉⊤.
Hence M ′ is still a model of S , Ia and Ea. Of course, M ′ is a counter-
model for ϕ→ [a]⊥.
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Lemma B.3 Let Fa = {¬l→ [a]¬l : a 6❀ l}. Then if S , Ea, Ia, Iaimp ,F
a |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥, then S , Ea, Ia, Iaimp |=PDL ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Proof: If S , Ea, Ia, Iaimp 6|=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥, then there exists a PDL-model
M = 〈W,R,V〉 such that |=
M
S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia ∧ Iaimp , and there is a possible
world w ∈W such that |=
M
w
ϕ and |=
M
w
〈a〉⊤.
We are going to construct a counter-model for S , Ea, Ia, Iaimp ,F
a |=
PDL
ϕ → [a]⊥. Let M ′ = 〈W′,R′,V′〉 be such that W′ = W, and R′a(w
′) = ∅ for
every w′ 6= w, and V′ = V.
Of course, M ′ is still a model of S , Ea, Ia and Iaimp .
For every Eˆa ⊆ Ea, the case where |=
M ′
w
ϕEˆa∧¬χ, with χ ∈ NewConsS (ψEˆa),
a 6❀ li, ∀li ∈ χ, is impossible, because |=
M
Iaimp and hence we would have
Ra(w) = ∅, contradicting the hypothesis that |=
M
w
〈a〉⊤.
Thus, we have to consider only the following cases:
• if |=
M ′
w
li, for every li such that a 6❀ li, then M
′ is also a model of Fa, and
then we have a counter-model for S , Ea, Ia, Iaimp ,F
a |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
• if |=
M ′
w
ϕEˆa∧
∧
¬li, where a 6❀ li and there is no clause χ ∈ NewConsS (ψEˆa)
such that li ∈ χ, for some Eˆa ⊆ E
a, then of course ψEˆa ∧
∧
¬li is sat-
isfiable, i.e., there is a valuation where ψEˆa ∧
∧
¬li holds. Let valEˆa be
such a valuation.
Consider, thus, v such that v /∈ W, and extend V′ such that V′(v) =
valEˆa. Now let M
′′ = 〈W′′,R′′,V′′〉 be such that W′′ = W′ ∪ {v}, and
R′′a(w) = valEˆa, and V
′′ = V′ ∪ {(v,V′(v))}.
Again, it can easily be checked that M ′′ is a model of S , Ea, Ia
and Iaimp . Moreover, it is a model of F
a, and hence a model for
S , Ea, Ia, Iaimp ,F
a and ϕ ∧ 〈a〉⊤.
Lemma B.4 If S , Ea, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, then S , Ia, Iaimp |=PDL ϕ→ [a]⊥.
Proof: Let
Ea+ = {ϕEˆa → [a]ψEˆa : Eˆ
a ⊆ Ea,S ∪ {ϕEˆa} 6|= ⊥,S ∪ {ψEˆa} 6|= ⊥}
Ea− = {ϕEˆa → [a]ψEˆa : Eˆ
a ⊆ Ea,S ∪ {ϕEˆa} 6|= ⊥,S |= ψEˆa → ⊥}
The following steps establish the result.
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1. S , Ea, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, by hypothesis
2. S , Ea, Ia, Iaimp |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 1. and monotonicity
3. S |=
PDL
∧
Ea ↔ (
∧
Ea+ ∧
∧
Ea−), by definition of Ea+ and Ea−, and
PDL
4. S , Ea+ ∪ Ea−, Ia, Iaimp |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 2. and 3.
5. Ea− ⊆ Iaimp , as if ϕEˆa → [a]ψEˆa ∈ E
a−, then S |= ψEˆa → ⊥, and then
⊥ ∈ NewConsS (ψEˆa), from which it follows that (ϕEˆa ∧ ⊤) → [a]⊥ ∈
Iaimp , and then ϕEˆa → [a]⊥ ∈ I
a
imp
6. S , Ea+, Ia, Iaimp |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 4. and 5.
7. S , Ea+, Ia, Iaimp ,F
a |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 6. and definition of ❀, where
Fa = {¬l→ [a]¬l : a 6❀ l}.
8. S , Ea+, Ia, Iaimp |=PDL ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 7. and Lemma B.3.
9. S , Ia, Iaimp |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥, from 8. and Lemma B.2, whose hypothesis
is satisfied by the definition of Ea+.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
(⇒): Straightforward, as every time S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ → [a]⊥, we have
S , Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥, and then Iaimp never changes.
(⇐): We are going to show that if S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥ and Iaimp = ∅,
then S , Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥.
1. S , Ea,X a, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, by hypothesis
2. S , Ea, Ia |=
❀
ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 1. and Lemma B.1
3. S , Ia, Iaimp |=PDL ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 2. and Lemma B.4
4. S , Ia |=
PDL
ϕ→ [a]⊥, from 3. and hypothesis Iaimp = ∅.
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